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2014 Welfare Use by Immigrants vs. Natives
in the United States
Jessica Pabst*
ABSTRACT. Welfare use by immigrants has been a political issue since the inception of
the United States. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 was intended to cut immigrant welfare use. Since 1996, various studies have found
conflicting evidence of the 1996 welfare reform’s effectiveness when comparing
immigrant welfare use to native use. This paper analyzes the individual use of Medicaid,
a proxy for welfare, in 2014, by immigrants versus natives in the United States. The study,
using a logit model, shows that in 2014 the probability of participating in Medicaid was
lower for immigrants than natives.
The land flourished because it was fed from so many sources–because it was
nourished by so many cultures and traditions and peoples.
- Lyndon B. Johnson
You cannot simultaneously have free immigration and a welfare state.
- Milton Friedman

I. Introduction
Is America really the land of opportunity? The majority of immigrants
come to America in search of a better life and job opportunities. The
question is if the United States is able to provide these opportunities or if
immigrants need other sources of income such as welfare to survive.
Immigrant welfare use is a political issue because of the perceived
disparities in welfare use between immigrants and natives. Politicians
have attempted to mitigate the controversy surrounding immigrant welfare
use through reform. This study uses a logit model to look at Medicaid
participation, a proxy for welfare, by immigrants versus natives in the
United States during 2014. The study shows that in 2014, the probability
of participation in Medicaid was lower for immigrants than natives.

*I would like to thank Professor Shahina Amin for assistance with this study.
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II. Essential Background
Although immigrants founded the United States of America, there has
been controversy surrounding immigration since its inception.
Restrictions on immigrants have been in place since colonial times to
minimize the cost of potential public charges (Borjas 2002, 2). Policies
extending from colonial times all fall under the public charge doctrine.
The public charge doctrine is the principle that a country should prevent
non-refugee immigrants from entering a country if they are likely to
become financially reliant on the government (Camarota 2015, 25). The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 was major welfare reform intended to curb welfare use by
immigrants in the United States and deter the immigration of people who
will be public charges. The three provisions in the act related to
immigrants were:
1. Non-citizens in the country before August 22, 1996 were removed
from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and food stamps within the
year.
2. Non-citizens who entered the United States after August 22, 1996
were ineligible for most types of public assistance until they became
a US citizen.
3. When applying for public assistance, immigrants’ sponsor’s income
and assets were deemed to be part of immigrants’ income for up to
ten years after the immigrant moved to the United States. (Borjas
2002, 7)
Refugees and asylees are excluded from the above requirements and are
eligible for federal welfare programs. On the other hand, legal immigrants
(who have been issued a green card) are ineligible for welfare until five
years after entering the country (Camarota 2015, 25). These restrictions
were some of the most controversial provisions of the 1996 welfare
reform. In 1997, Congress restored the right to provide Supplemental
Security Income to a majority of the immigrants who arrived before
August 1996. In 1998, Congress reinstated the power to provide food
stamps for children and elderly immigrants who were in the US before
August 1996. The support for the reenactment of programs such as food
stamps for all legal immigrants has been bipartisan. For example,
President Bush’s 2003 budget proposed the restoration of food stamp
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benefits for all legal immigrants (Fremstad 2002, 1). The bipartisan
support and the subsequent changes to portions of the 1996 welfare
reform did little to revive federal welfare benefits for most legal
immigrants.
After the 1996 welfare reform, states were left with the decision to
create new programs for the now ineligible immigrants. Less than half of
the states chose to enact welfare programs such as Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF), various cash assistance, and food stamps for
immigrants. These state-funded programs were available to a limited
group of immigrants. Approximately one-third of legal, noncitizen
immigrants’ cash assistance and food stamp benefits were fully restored
by the states after federal welfare reform (Fremstad 2002, 5). Since a
majority of legal immigrants have remained ineligible for welfare
benefits, the 1996 welfare reform seems to be effective. The small portion
of immigrants who are eligible for welfare programs are a reason why
immigrant welfare use remains a contested issue among politicians and
academics.

III. Literature Review
Borjas and Hilton (1995) measured the use of welfare by immigrant
households in means-tested programs before the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. This study used panel
data from 1984, 1985, 1990 and 1991 from the Survey of Income and
Programs Participation. The survey collects monthly data by interviewing
individuals every four months. In the early 1990s, the authors found
20.7% of immigrant households participated in some type of welfare
assistance, whereas 14.1% of native households participated. The gap
between immigrant and native households was 6.6 percentage points
(Borjas & Hilton 1995, 2). The programs included in the study were cash
benefits, Medicaid, food stamps and housing subsidies. When limiting
welfare-use to cash benefit programs, Borjas and Hilton found the gap to
be much smaller with a difference of 3.5 percentage points (Borjas &
Hilton 1995, 6). The study examined welfare use before the 1996 welfare
reform, which can be compared to use after the reform.
Borjas (2002) found there to be a significant drop in the immigrant
welfare participation rate after the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. He attributed this drop solely to
California, which saw a decrease of welfare use by non-citizens of 4.8
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percentage points more than that of citizen households. When California
was excluded, there was no significant difference between non-citizen
and citizen households (Borjas 2002, 3). Borjas attributed the drop in
welfare use to California’s social pressures and removed it when
measuring the effects of welfare reform on the rest of the country. The
social pressures in California pertaining to immigrant welfare use were
related to the passage of Proposition 187, a 1994 ballot initiative.
Proposition 187 established a state-run citizenship screening program and
prohibited illegal immigrants from receiving non-emergency healthcare,
public education, and other social services (Wikipedia: The Free
Encyclopedia 2016 ). Borjas’s removal of Californian immigrants
disregarded roughly 30.9% of US immigrants in the 1990s (Camarota
2001, 5). Borjas’s study was also limited by classifying groups into noncitizens and citizens, while in his previous study he separated the groups
into immigrants and natives. Camarota’s 2015 study used a similar
technique to Borjas but included California.
Camarota’s 2015 study for the Center for Immigration Studies also
examined immigrant versus native welfare use. Camarota used the Survey
of Income and Program Participation 2008 panel data set. Camarota found
that when looking at broad categories of programs, welfare use by
immigrants was higher for all programs except housing assistance or
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (Camarota 2015, 5). He also
found that if native and immigrant households did participate in welfare
programs, they used the same average number of programs. Native and
immigrant households participating in welfare also spent similar amounts
of time on a program (Camarota 2015, 7). Camarota’s study found that
welfare use is higher for immigrants even after the 1996 eligibility
restrictions, but Fix and Passel (2002) found the opposite.
Fix and Passel (2002) found that non-citizens’ welfare use declined
by more percentage points than citizens’ use following the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
Decreases in immigrant welfare use were not due to the law but rather the
“chilling effect” the new reform had on attitudes towards immigrants. The
chilling effect was attributed to the icy policy climate during the time. In
1996, two other laws were passed that pertained to immigrants: The
Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 imposed the
following policies on immigrants:
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1. Illegal immigrants convicted of minor misdemeanors became eligible
for deportation, which previously hadn’t been the case.
2. If someone lived illegally in the U.S. for more than 365 days, he or
she would be banned from returning to the country for 10 years.
3. If someone lived illegally in the U.S. for 365 days or less, he or she
would be prohibited from returning for three years.
4. Any deported person would be permanently prohibited from entering
the U.S. if he or she returned before the end of the period for which
he or she was banned. (Hrenchir 2015)
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was enacted
in response to the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing and the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing. The law required all appeal claims by a person
to be put into one appeal, limiting successive petitions, which effectively
restricted habeas corpus. Appeals could only succeed if convictions were
“contrary to ‘clearly established federal law’ or an ‘unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence’” (Cornell University
Law School). Although the law was not explicitly related to immigrants,
it fed into the country’s climate towards foreigners. According to Fix and
Passel (2002), the “chilling effect” in 1996 on attitudes caused
immigrants to lower their welfare use despite being eligible (13). They
also found that immigrant use of Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families, Supplemental Security Income, and food stamps was lower than
natives. The use of Medicaid between immigrants and natives was the
same (Fix & Passel 2002, 17). Watson (2010) proceeded to study
Medicaid use in immigrants in relation to various policy incentives.
Watson (2010) examined the use of Medicaid in legal children of
non-citizen immigrants. Watson created 25 clusters of the 33 Immigration
and Naturalization Services districts and compared the use of welfare
among immigrants between the clusters. Immigration enforcement was
measured as “the number of deportable aliens located divided by the
estimated number of non-citizens in 1995” (Watson 2010, 8). Watson
(2010) found that heightened federal immigration enforcement lowered
Medicaid participation of eligible children of non-citizens (28).
Therefore, the decline in use of welfare programs such as Medicaid may
not be attributed directly to policies intended to curb use but rather to
seemingly unrelated policies (Watson 2010, 29).
Clearly there is conflicting evidence on welfare use by immigrants
versus natives in the United States. The 1996 welfare reform was an
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attempt to reduce immigrant use of public assistance. Studies after the
reform have not yet created clear consensus of its effectiveness. My
model will attempt to clarify these differences.

IV. Model
The data for this study were collected from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series. The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series collects
and distributes samples of the American population from fifteen federal
censuses and the American Community Surveys from 2000. Only data
from the 2014 survey was used in this study. A total of 2,469,680
observations were used in my analysis.
Past studies have focused on household welfare use because many
welfare programs, such as housing subsidies or food stamps, are based on
the household in which an individual lives. Instead, I studied Medicaid
use of an individual, which is a proxy for welfare use. I focused on
Medicaid use because 13.5% of my observations participated in Medicaid
whereas only 1.5% received welfare income, which included
Supplemental Security Income, Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
and general assistance. Aid to Families with Dependent Children was
eliminated in 1996 with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, so the welfare income variable
from my dataset only included Supplemental Security Income and cash
assistance for 2014. I believed that the higher percentage of participation
in Medicaid increased the accuracy of my model in comparing welfare
use of immigrants versus natives. By measuring welfare use through
Medicaid participation of individual adults, my study focuses on
individuals who are capable of earning an income. Individual welfare use
omits native children or immigrants’ spouses who are included in an
immigrant’s household welfare use. Household welfare use is determined
if any one person in a household participates in a welfare program. In
some cases, this means children that receive free school lunches. In this
study, an immigrant is defined as a person born outside of the United
States, including non-citizens and naturalized citizens.
I based the final model in my study on the existing literature as well
as labor economics principles. In determining my final model, I ran a
series of logit regressions using different socioeconomic variables as
independent variables and Medicaid use (MEDICAID) as the dependent
variable.
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The following logit model was used for my study:
P (MEDICAID) =
Where MEDICAID = $0 + $1 IMM + $2 MALE + $3 MARR
+ $4 ENGLANG + $5 LABOR + $6 OWNHOME + $7BLACK
+ $8 AMEIND + $9 ASIAN + $10 OTHER + $11 AGE + $12 AGESQD
+ $13 FAMSIZE + $14 MULTGENS + $15 NCHLT5 + $16 HIGRAD
+ $17 ASSOCIATES + $18 BACHELORS + $19 MASTERS
+ $20 NEWEG + $21 MIDATL + $22 ENCENTRAL
+ $23 WNCENTRAL + $24 SOUATL + $25 ESCENTRAL
+ $26 WSCENTRAL + $27 MOUNT + g
*g is a random error term
A. VARIABLES & DATA
For the logit regression I ran, I used MEDICAID as the dependent
variable. MEDICAID is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual has
participated in Medicaid within the past 12 months and 0 otherwise.
Medicaid participation was 16.20% and 13.02% for immigrants and
natives, respectively.
In my study, I eliminated all people under the age of 18 years old. I
eliminated children to focus on the issue if immigrants are moving to the
United States to take advantage of its various social assistance programs
rather than to work and earn an income sufficient to survive. The
independent variables related to age are AGE and AGESQD. AGE is an
individual’s age in years. AGESQD is an individual’s age squared. The
expected sign for AGE is positive because as a person ages, his need for
income will gradually rise. The expected sign for AGESQD is negative
because the positive effect of AGE decreases as AGE increases. This
approach is standard in the literature.
The variables related to family demographics are: FAMSIZE,
MULTGENS, NCHLT5, and MARR. FAMSIZE measures the number of
people in an individual’s family. The expected sign of FAMSIZE is
positive. MULTGENS is a dummy variable indicating a 1 if three or more
generations live in an individual’s household and 0 otherwise. The
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expected sign is positive. NCHLT5 measures the number of children
under 5 years old that live in an individual's house, and its expected sign
is positive The expected signs for FAMSIZE, MULTGENS, and
NCHLT5 are positive because the more members in an individual’s
family, the higher the division of income and thus an increased likelihood
of a need for welfare. MARR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
individual is married and the spouse lives in the same house and 0
otherwise. The expected signed is negative because the added income in
a person’s house should decrease the need for welfare.
To account for an individual’s immigration status I used the dummy
variable IMM. IMM takes on a value of 1 if the individual is an
immigrant and 0 if not. The expected coefficient is uncertain based on the
literature. I did not consider illegal immigrants in my study since illegal
immigrants are ineligible to receive welfare in the United States. If illegal
immigrants receive welfare, it is through an illegally obtained Social
Security number, which would be unfeasible to determine.
In the United States, a useful skill for working is the ability to speak
English. To control for this, the dummy variable ENGLANG was created.
If the individual reported that he speaks and reads English, ENGLANG
equals 1 and is 0 otherwise. The expected sign is negative because
speaking English is an important skill for the labor force. The higher
probability of labor force participation in more skilled jobs should lead
to a smaller need for welfare.
To indicate if a person is in the labor force, the dummy variable
LABOR was used. LABOR takes on a value of 1 if the individual is
participating in the labor force and 0 otherwise. The expected sign of this
variable is negative. Participation in the labor force results in a higher
income and less need for welfare.
Educational attainment is included as a series of dummy variables.
These variables are HIGRAD, ASSOCIATES, BACHELORS, and
MASTERS. HIGRAD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual
only graduated from high school and 0 otherwise. ASSOCIATES is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual went to college for one to two
years and 0 otherwise. If an individual received a Bachelor’s degree, the
dummy variable BACHELORS equals 1 and is 0 otherwise. The dummy
variable MASTERS equals 1 if an individual has his Master’s degree and
0 otherwise. The expected sign of these variables is negative because of
the increase in income associated with higher educational attainment in
comparison to no high school diploma.
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Race is included as a series of dummy variables. These variables are
WHITE, BLACK, AMEIND, ASIAN, and OTHER. WHITE includes
people of Caucasian and Hispanic descent. BLACK equals 1 if a person
reported his race as black and is 0 otherwise. The value of AMEIND is 1
if an individual is of American Indian or Alaskan native descent and 0
otherwise. ASIAN includes anyone of Chinese, Japanese, Pacific Islander,
or other Asian descent. OTHER equals 1 if the individual’s race is
classified as other, mixed of two major races, or mixed of three or more
major races or 0 otherwise. WHITE is the omitted variable in my model.
Homeownership (OWNHOME) is another indicator of the need for
welfare assistance because it is a large asset. Large assets are a proxy for
wealth. OWNHOME is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual
owns his home and 0 otherwise. The expected sign is negative because
homeownership generally indicates an individual has higher income
levels.
The region of the country an individual lives in is also an important
indicator of welfare use. Borjas’s 2002 study stated that immigrants living
in California contributed to the country’s decrease in immigrant welfare
use. To see if this was true, a series of dummy variables was created. The
dummy variables pertain to the various United States Census regions (in
the Appendix). These variables were all compared to the dummy variable
PACIFIC that includes California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and
Hawaii. The expected sign of the region variables is negative according
to Borjas’s 2002 study.
On the following page are a summary of my variables.
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B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Dummy Variables
Variable
USCITIZEN
IMM
MARR
MULTGENS
ENGLANG
LABOR
NOHIGRAD
HIGRAD
ASSOCIATES
BACHELORS
MASTERS
W HITE
BLACK
ASIAN
OTHER
AM EIND
OW NHOME
PACIFIC
NEW EG
MIDATL
ENCENTRAL
W NCENTRAL
SOUATL
ESCENTRAL
W SCENTRAL
MOUNT
MEDICAID

Expected Sign
?
+
+
+
+
-

Frequency
2,310,533
374,721
1,267,037
166,668
236,388
1,506,326
264,698
928,135
581,195
431,023
264,629
1,930,631
256,690
127,309
130,010
25,040
1,692,960
393,764
119,720
329,893
369,869
165,729
489,230
148,347
280,640
172,488
333,472

Percent
93.56%
15.17%
51.30%
6.75%
95.90%
60.99%
10.72%
37.58%
23.53%
17.45%
10.72%
78.17%
10.39%
5.15%
5.26%
1.01%
68.55%
15.94%
4.85%
13.36%
14.98%
6.71%
19.81%
6.01%
11.36%
6.98%
13.50%

Continuous Variables

AGE
FAMSIZE
NCHLT5

Expected Sign
+
+
+

MAX
96
20
6

MIN
18
1
0

MEAN
49.40
2.60
0.11

Std. DEV
18.69
1.58
0.39
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V. Results
The regression shows that in 2014, participation in Medicaid was less
likely for immigrants than for natives in the United States. All variables
in the model were statistically significant at the 1% level (see Results
Table). The coefficients of my variables measure the marginal effects
after logit. The dummy variables, whose values are either 0 or 1, mean
that the probability of welfare use increases if that variable is positive or
decreases if it is negative. The continuous variables in my model are
interpreted as an increase in probability of an individual’s Medicaid
participation. The coefficients estimate probabilities at a point on the
curve. The point is the observation average based on explanatory
variables. For FAMSIZE, a continuous variable, the value 0.01255 is
interpreted as a 1.255% increase in the probability of a person
participating in Medicaid for every additional person in his family.
ASIAN and NEWEG had unexpected coefficient signs. The positive
coefficient for ASIAN was surprising because people of Asian descent
typically are less likely to need welfare because of their higher
educational attainment in comparison to whites. The unexpected sign may
be due to the low percentage (5.15%) of Asian people in my data. The
positive coefficient for NEWEG could be due to the higher cost of living
in the region in comparison to the Pacific census region.
The variables that have the largest impact on an individual’s
probability of participating in Medicaid in my results are LABOR and
MALE. If a person is in the labor force or male, there is a lower
probability of participating in Medicaid. Labor force participation is a
large portion of the decrease in the probability of Medicaid participation
due to the increase in income associated with working and therefore a
lower likelihood for needing assistance such as Medicaid. Males are also
less likely to participate in Medicaid, which could be due to the higher
percentage of males who are the primary household worker and the pay
gap between men and women.
The variable of focus in my study, IMM, had a negative coefficient.
That means that, all else equal, immigrants were less likely than natives
to use of Medicaid. Although Medicaid participation of immigrants was
not targeted in the 1996 welfare reform, it was part of the federal fiveyear waiting period by which immigrants must abide. States do provide
Medicaid to certain populations of immigrants, some of whom were
excluded from my study. Medicaid is available to immigrant children or
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immigrant children and pregnant women who do not meet the five-year
waiting period requirement. In addition, all immigrants are eligible for
Medicaid in emergency situations. The five-year waiting period for
immigrants and the non-emergency provision could be the reason for the
lower likelihood of participating in Medicaid if an individual is an
immigrant.
To measure the overall fit of the model, I used McFadden’s R-squared
which was 0.187. McFadden’s R-squared is a pseudo r-squared term used
to measure the overall fit of a logit model. An r-squared of 0.187 means
that my model was able to explain 18.7% of the variation in the data. For
labor economics, low r-squared values are typical due to the numerous
important but un-measurable personal, economic, and social variables. An
r-squared of 0.187 is thus a good fit for my model.
My results table is on the next page.

VI. Conclusion
My study shows that the likelihood of participating in Medicaid in 2014
was lower for adult immigrants than natives. The focus on individual use
by adults could be a factor as to why my results differ from some of the
existing literature. Previous studies have measured immigrant welfare use
through household use. Household use of welfare programs can include
native use in an immigrant household because of children, which would
overestimate immigrant welfare use. The focus on adults who are lawfully
able to sustain themselves is a better measure for the potential of public
charges. My study reveals that immigrants earn a sufficient level of
income to provide for themselves and are less likely to take advantage of
welfare programs than natives; thus, welfare programs are not likely a
significant factor in immigration decisions. In the future, a time-series
analysis of individual use of all welfare programs would provide greater
insight into the issue across policy climates. Measuring immigrants’
contribution to welfare programs versus use of welfare programs could
further enhance the results and discussion.
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RESULTS TABLE
IM M

-.01332***
(.00052)

BLACK

.04252***
(.00063)

MARR

-.08622***
(.00045)

ASIAN

.01964***
(.00096)

ENGLANG

-.02496***
(.00098)

OTHER

.01481***
(.00076)

LABOR

-.10987***
(.00048)

AMEIND

.047797***
(.00191)

HIGRAD

-.03793***
(.00045)

OW NHOME

-.08780***
(.00049)

ASSOCIATES

-.05853***
(.00039)

MULTGENS

.008897***
(.0007)

BACHELORS

-.08046***
(.00036)

NEW ENG

.027396***
(.00099)

MASTERS

-.08367***
(.000333)

MIDATL

-.0012495***
(.00057)

ENCENTRAL

-.01075***
(.00054)

AGESQD

-.00004***
(.00005)

W NCENTRAL

-.01893***
(.00065)

AGE

.00432***
(.00005)

SOUATL

-.03207***
(.00045)

FAMSIZE

.01255***
(.00013)

ESCENTRAL

-.014418***
(.00066)

NCHLT5

.038822***
(.0002)

W SCENTRAL

-.03788***
(.00045)

MALE

MOUNT

-.01389***
(.00064)

MCFADDEN’S
ADJ R-SQD

0.187

***Indicates statistically significant at 1% level

-.0143l98***
(.000333)
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Appendix
Census Regions

States

PACIFIC

Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon,
Washington

NEWEG

Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont

MIDATL

New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania

ENCENTRAL

Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin

WNCENTRAL

Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, South Dakota

SOUATL

Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia

ESCENTRAL

Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee

WSCENTRAL

Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma/Indian
Territory, Texas

MOUNT

Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming
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